Unfccc Paris Agreement Countries

The inconsistency between the subtlety of the differentiation of the Paris Agreement and the self-differentiation of the NDCs could at least lead countries to refuse to make their NDCs more ambitious because they perceive the NDCs of other countries as less ambitious (see Grieco et al., 1993; Mearsheimer, 1994). This, in turn, can lead to negotiation difficulties before the NDCs are updated by 2020 and beyond. In the worst-case scenario, it could undermine the ambition mechanism of the Paris Agreement: if countries are cautious or reluctant to increase their ambitions over time, it is more likely that the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement will be missed. Mbeva K, Pauw WP (2016) Self-differentiation of countries` responsibilities: addressing climate change through Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, Discussion Paper 4/2016. German Institute for Development Policy (DIE), Bonn, Germany Recognizing that many developing countries and small island states that have contributed the least to climate change could suffer the most from it, the Paris Agreement contains a plan for industrialized countries – and others that are in a position to do so  » – to continue to provide financial resources to help developing countries mitigate and increase the resilience to climate change n. The agreement builds on the financial commitments of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, which aimed to scale public and private climate finance for developing countries to $100 billion a year by 2020. (To put that in perspective, global military spending amounted to about $1.7 trillion in 2017 alone, more than a third of which came from the United States.) The Copenhagen Pact also created the Green Climate Fund to mobilize transformative financial funds with targeted public dollars. The Paris Agreement expected the world to set a higher annual target by 2025 to build on the $100 billion target for 2020 and put in place mechanisms to achieve that scale. As regards the differentiation of procedures, least developed countries and SIDS benefit from flexibility in the preparation of mitigation measures (Article 4(6)); particularly vulnerable countries receive a share of the proceeds of the adjustment cost reduction mechanism (Article 6(6)); and `other undeveloped parties` providing financial assistance are invited to do so (Article 9(5) and (7)). . .

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